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RECENT DECISIONS
Labor Law - Restrictive Measure - The defendant, head of the
Federation of Musicians, was charged by information with violation of
the Lea Act,' for attempting to compel and coerce a licensed radio
station to employ additional persons not needed by the station to
perform actual services. The coercion was allegedly accomplished by:
1) directing three musicians of the Chicago Federation of Musicians,
employed by the radio station, to discontinue their employment. 2)
By directing said musicians, and other members of the Chicago Federa-
tion of Musicians, not to accept employment at said radio station.
3) By placing a picket in front'of the radio station.
Pertinent section of the act - 506 (a) It shall be unlawful,
by the use or express or implied threat of the use of force,
violence, intimidation, or duress, or by the use or express or
implied threat of the use of other means, to coerce, compel or
constrain or attempt to coerce, compel, or constrain a licensee -
"(1) to employ or agree to employ, in connection with the
conduct of the broadcasting business of such licensee, any per-
son or persons in excess of the number of employees needed by
such licensee to perform actual services;
Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the Lea Act, on
which the information was based, (a) Abridges freedom of speech
in contravention to the First Amendment; (b) Is repugnant to the
Fifth Amendment, because it defines a crime in terms that are vague,
and denies equal protection of the law; (c) Imposes involuntary
servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The district
court held for the defendant on the above stated grounds, holding
the Lea Act violative of the First, Fifth, and Thirteenth Amendments.
Held: Reversed. (1) The language of the Act is not too vague and
does provide an adequate warning as to what conduct falls under its
ban. (2) The contention that the Lea Act denies equal protection of
the laws to radio employees as a class cannot prevail, as it is not
within the court's province to say that because Congress has prohibited
some practices within it's power to prohibit, it must prohibit all within
it's power. (3) The contention that the statute abridges freedom
of speech, by making peaceful picketing a crime, is not properly before
the court since the District Court ruled on the statute as it was pro-
posed to be applied, by the information as it then read, rather than
holding the statute as written to be an unconstitutional violation of
the First Amendment. "United States v. Petrillo 67 S. Ct. 1538
U. S. 1947."
It must be noted that the instant case passed only on the constitu-
tionality of the statute on it's face. The court indicated however, that
the information as worded by the plaintiff could cause the statute to
260 Statute 89.47 U.S.C.A. Section 506.
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be applied so as to violate the constitutional rights of the defendant
The act itself is not unconstitutional for this reason as a rule of statu-
tory construction,' and because the plaintiff can amend the information
to bring it within the scope of the defendant's constitutional guaranties. 3
Nor does the statute mention picketing, peaceful or violent, and ob-
jection to the statute on the ground that the information charges
coercion by picketing does not reach the question of the constitution-
ality of the statute.
The constitutionality of the statute was put in issue by the motion
to dismiss on the ground that the statute was repugnant to the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment because its words, "Number
of employees needed by such licensee," are so vague that persons of
ordinary intelligence cannot in advance tell whether a certain action,
or course of action, would be within its prohibition. In holding the
statute sufficiently definite, the court reaffirmed its position that the
possibility of marginal cases, in which it is difficult to determine ,the
side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls, is insufficient
reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense.4
A standard of what constitutes "needed employees" was not set down,
it being held that this must be decided in light of all the evidence.
In holding that the statute does not violate equal protection, the
court held as previously held,5 that if Congress believes that there are
employee practices in the radio industry which injuriously affect inter-
state commerce, and directs its prohibition against those practices, the
court cannot set aside its legislation even if it was persuaded that
employer practices also required regulation.
The decision of the case leaves the determination o fthe number
of persons needed to operate a radio station to be decided by the
evidence. It is respectfully submitted that justice would be more ably
served and vagueness avoided, if a norm or scale of the necessary
operating staff would be established. As the law stands, a difference
of opinion between employer and labor leader, as to the number of
necessary personnel, and an attempt by the labor leader to act on his
opinion subjects him to the penalty of a criminal offense. The al-
ternative is to allow the employer's estimate, of needed personnel to
be conclusive. The court has stated that the employer's estimate is
not conclusive, but has left no alternative to the defendant but to
submit to such estimate or to subject himself to criminal liability by
acting in disagreement of said estimate.
It is interesting to note that the so-called Taft Hartley bill became
law while the instant case was being decided. The two laws are similar
2 Rescue Army v. Municipal Court 67 S.Ct. 130 (1947).
3 Rules of Criminal Procedure, 7 (D), 18 U.S.C.A.
4 Robinson v. U.S. 324 U.S. 282 (1944).
5 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1.
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in many respects, the Lea Act a bit more drastic as it exposes a violator
to criminal liability whereas the Taft-Hartley laws makes the coercion
of an employer to employ men not needed, an unfair labor practice.
The Lea Act applies only to the radio industry whereas the later Taft
law purports to cover all industries. It further appears that the later
law will affect the radio industry also, especially the union practice
of requiring standby employees to be paid to standby while an amateur
unit is performing. The applicable section of the later law states: "to
cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to
pay or deliver any money or other thing of value, in the nature of
an exaction, for services which are not performed, or not to be per-
formed." The violation of the foregoing section is considered an
unfair labor practice, and this would appear more equitable than the
Lea Act in that a union head could make an attempt to have more
men employed without risking criminal liability. In this way, the
employers theory of the number of employees necessary would not
be the only determining factor as to that number.
WIT.TiS HASBERRY
6Labor fanagement Relations Act 1947-8 (b) (6).
19471
